America the word "Britain" is of profound significance.
It evokes a multitude of thoughts. Whether the word be taken in its
narrowest sense as meaning merely England, or extended to the British
Isles, or broadened to include those self-governing dominions which
go to make up the English- speaking commonwealth of nations, or, finally,
widened to signify the vast assemblage of lands and peoples known
as the British Empire, we Americans instinctively realize that here
is something which to us is of deep concern.
is true of Americans generally, whatever their origin, because the
United States is an English-speaking country, settled mainly by people
of British stock, who built up a civilization, fundamentally Anglo-Saxon
in character, that has set its stamp upon all who have reached our
shores. For most Americans the significance of Britain is not merely
a matter of cultural acquirement but also of racial inheritance --
in other words, something in the blood. Despite recent immigration
from Southern and Eastern Europe, the population of the United States
is still basically Anglo-Saxon, while a decided majority of its inhabitants
are of British or kindred North European stocks.
essentially Anglo-Saxon character of our stock and
civilization makes a study of things British at once
peculiarly interesting and peculiarly important. Since race is unquestionably
the basic factor in human affairs, we have weighty reasons for observing
our British kin. This will aid us not only in our relations with them
but also in our own domestic problems. For with folk so similar, a
knowledge of what sort of people the British really are, and of what
they are thinking and doing, will throw much light on what sort of
people we ourselves are and what is the significance of our thoughts
is a narrow and short-sighted view which holds that the parallel development
of the British and American peoples is due chiefly to ease and frequency
of intellectual intercourse -- that we are so much alike because we
can read each other's books and newspapers and can talk without an
interpreter. That is rather putting the cart before the horse. It
ignores the much more fundamental query as to how we both got that
way. You can realize the significance of this point by a very simple
test. Compare a conversation you have had with an Englishman and a
conversation you have had with a person of some other nationality.
The chances are ten to one that in analyzing those conversations you
will discover a very significant distinction between them -- the fact
that you met your Englishman on a footing of more instinctive comprehension.
As you look back you will probably remember that there were a lot
of rather subtle things like viewpoints, ideals, prejudices even,
which you could more or less take for granted with the Englishman,
but which you could not thus tacitly assume with the other.
am not here referring to knowledge of facts; your
Englishman may have been ignorant, while the other
man may have been learned in the topics you discussed. Likewise, I
am not concerned with the outcome of those conversations; you may
have disagreed violently with the Englishman and have agreed fully
with the other. Yet even that violent controversy between yourself
and the Englishman had an intimate note; that is to say, in all probability
it was not a clash between absolutely antagonistic ideals, but rather
a family row over details -- a magnifying of differences, perhaps
just because you two had started with so much in common.
this is of great practical importance, because it furnishes a clew
to the understanding not merely of personal contacts between individual
Englishmen and Americans but also of the relations between the American
and British peoples. We two peoples cannot be really indifferent to
each other, any more than members of the same family can be really
indifferent to one another. Anglo-American relations must be characterized
by a peculiar family quality which contains great possibilities for
good and for ill. Things which between other nations might not make
a ripple can, as between Americans and Englishmen, promote warm sympathy
or provoke bitter resentment.
is why the fullest possible understanding is so necessary between
the two peoples. Here, if ever, "a little knowledge is a dangerous
thing." Englishmen and Americans who know each other just well
enough to see their differences are apt to quarrel. Englishmen and
Americans who know each other intimately realize that such differences
are far outweighed by common likenesses and
usually succeed in maintaining friendly harmony in
outlook and action.
friendship was never more needed than it is today. The American and
British peoples are unquestionably the strongest and stablest elements
in a very troubled world, and their friendly co-operation is the best
hope of the future. Probably no reflective American or Englishman
thinks otherwise. And yet, desirable though this may be, it need not
necessarily come about. Minor points of friction exist and misunderstandings
are always liable to arise. The best way to better Anglo-American
relations is to know each other better, thereby gaining that broader
vision and deeper insight that can sense the relative importance of
things and act accordingly.
and what, then, are these British kin of ours?
speaking, the British people are at once a blend and a mixture. That
fact gives the key to their national character, and explains both
their past history and their present tendencies. An English writer
once called his country Teutonic with a Celtic fringe. Translating
this into modern racial terms, we can say that the population of Britain
is predominantly Nordic, with a Mediterranean element that varies
widely in strength in different parts of the island.
racial destiny was fixed about 1500 years ago, after the fall of the
Roman Empire. Down to that time the British Isles had been inhabited
almost entirely by the slender, dark-complexioned race called Mediterranean,
which still inhabits most of the lands about the Mediterranean Sea
and which settled the British Isles long before the dawn of history.
After the fall of Rome swarms of
tall blond Nordics, coming from Germany and Scandinavia,
invaded Britain and ultimately transformed the island's racial character.
Nordic influx was, however, of a peculiar nature and had peculiar
results. If the Nordics had come all at once in vast numbers they
would have quickly overrun the whole island, would have subdued the
Mediterraneans at a stroke, and would ultimately have intermarried
and formed a generally mixed population. But just the reverse of this
took place. The Nordics came in relatively small numbers, settling
first on the eastern coasts and gradually working inland. Also, the
Mediterraneans put up a stiff fight and gave ground slowly. In other
words, a situation arose very much like that which occurred during
the settlement of America -- an invading frontier pushing slowly westward,
with fierce hatred between invaders and natives, little intermarriage,
and therefore a thorough racial replacement. For this reason Eastern
England is to-day almost purely Nordic in race.
Britain was not destined to become a purely Nordic land. The western
fringe of the island is rugged and relatively infertile. In these
wild lands the Mediterraneans found refuge, while the pursuing Nordics
had no special temptation to conquer them. For a long while Britain
was divided between two sharply contrasted races, the Nordics occupying
most of the island, while the western fringes, especially Wales, Cornwall,
and the Scotch Highlands, were solidly Mediterranean. In time these
race lines became somewhat blurred by intermarriage; yet even today
England and Scotland are four-fifths Nordic, while Wales is mainly
Mediterranean in blood.
the Nordics were undergoing an important development among themselves.
Instead of coming all at once, the Nordic invaders came at different
times and from different places. The first invaders, who were Angles,
Saxons, and Jutes, came from Northwestern Germany. Later came Danes
and Norwegians, and finally the Normans, who were also Scandinavians,
settled for a short time on French soil and with just a dash of French
blood. These different sorts of Nordics ultimately intermarried- and
fused into a new English type.
fused. That is the important thing to remember. When different varieties
of the same race intermarry there is a real blend, from which springs
a new stock, harmonious and stable in character. On the other hand,
when different races intermarry, there is no blend but a mixture,
the children tending to belong mainly to one or other of the parent
stocks. In England, therefore, we get a new Nordic type. In Scotland
we also get a new type, differing slightly from the English owing
to a somewhat different blend of Nordic elements. Lastly, both these
new Nordic types mix lightly but continuously with the old Mediterranean
other words, we have that combination of racial blend and mixture
which is the key to English history and English character. Predominantly
Nordic as it is, the English stock shows those traits of creative
intelligence, political ability, and great energy steadied by common
sense that' are' displayed by all branches of the Nordic race. At
the same time, it must not be forgotten that the English stock has
received slight but continuous infusions of Mediterranean blood that
have tinctured many Eng-
lishmen with Mediterranean qualities like heightened
temperament, quick imagination, and artistic feeling. This Mediterranean
dash has been too slight to upset English stability and poise, but
it has been enough to give England many brilliant individuals and
partially to correct the tendency to heavy seriousness common among
pure-blooded Nordics, whether in England or elsewhere.
the valuable contributions that the Mediterranean element has made,
it is unquestionably the Nordic stock that is mainly responsible for
Britain's greatness. To Nordic energy, intelligence, and common sense
are due both England's political development at home and that extraordinary
achievement, the British Empire, which today covers nearly one-fourth
of the entire land surface of the globe and contains fully one-fourth
of the world's total population. Nordic, likewise, is the combination
of inventive genius and business ability which made Britain the industrial
and financial centre of the world. It is often said that Britain's
present wealth is due to the fortunate accident of rich coal and iron
deposits beneath her soil. That is true, in a sense. But it is also
true that these deposits would not have been developed without a remarkable
combination of English and Scotch inventors, manufacturers, financiers,
and workers, who first realized the possibilities of coal and iron,
got the jump on the rest of the world, and thereby gave Britain the
economic position which she has ever since retained.
Britain's progress has been so consistently successful, some observers
have been tempted to think that it just happened -- in other words,
that it was due to good fortune or fatality. Nothing, however, could
untrue. The closer we study English history, the
more we realize what immense problems Britain has had to face, and
what intelligence, determination, hard work, and common sense the
British people have shown in their solution.
the past century Britain has gone through one of the most tremendous
transformations that the world has ever seen. A hundred years ago
Britain was still mainly an agricultural country, capable of feeding
its relatively small population, which then numbered only about 14,000,000.
To-day the same area -- England, Scotland, and Wales -- has a population
of 43,000,000, four-fifths of whom live in cities or towns. Instead
of being self-feeding, Britain grows only enough foodstuffs to nourish
its people ninety days in the year. The rest of its food has to be
imported, together with all sorts of other raw materials and manufactured
products. This, in turn, means that the only way the British people
can pay for these things is by exporting to foreign countries a corresponding
amount of goods or services. Accordingly, Britain's very life to-day
depends upon a complex and delicately adjusted system of manufacturing,
commerce, shipping, and banking, which she has slowly built up and
which at all costs she must maintain.
yet, as already remarked, the very building up of this system has
involved a transformation of Britain's economic, social, and political
life so profound that most other countries would probably have fallen
into civil war or revolution. The British have, however, succeeded
in avoiding these evils and adjusting themselves peacefully to new
Primarily because of their national character -- in other words, because
of their racial make-up.
one can be long in England without being struck with the basic unity
of the English people. Of course, there are extremes of wealth and
poverty, of education and ignorance; and these produce a wide variety
of manners, ideas, and opinions. Yet beneath all such differences
we somehow sense the fact that these people are fundamentally of the
same stuff. Englishmen who have lived abroad get this impression as
sharply as observant foreigners.
long ago an English friend of mine who lives in New York City was
telling me his impressions of a trip home -- the first in several
friend goes to his New York office daily in the subway and is thus
accustomed to rub elbows with about every racial and national type
you know," he said, "the first time I rode in a London tube
I had the queerest feeling! I couldn't place it at first, but I soon
found that I was looking at the people in the car and comparing them
with the people in the New York subway. And then I realized that all
the people in that tube car were very much alike -- and very much
like me; I can't tell you how queerly it hit me; I just can't forget
that simple anecdote lies the secret of Britain's stability. In other
words, even when Englishmen talk and think differently they feel alike.
That is why foreign students of English politics are always going
wrong in their prophecies. How many times have we heard the statement
from some foreign observer that England was
standing on the verge of revolution? Our observer
may have made a careful study of the facts, have read all the speeches,
analyzed all the arguments, and proved quite logically that such irreconcilable
standpoints could not be compromised.
yet the revolution just didn't come off! After everybody had had his
say and had blown off steam, those angry Englishmen instinctively
realized that every one of them was "very much alike -- and very
much like me." Whereupon a compromise adjustment was somehow
evolved, the crisis was ended, and the country went on its way.
stable, evolutionary character of English political life is well illustrated
by the present situation. The advent of a Labor government to power
-- the first in British history -- is certainly a momentous event.
But there is nothing revolutionary about it. When I was last in England
I made a careful study of British political conditions, and I was
interested to observe the quiet, temperate way in which political
possibilities were discussed and discounted.
informally with representative spokesmen of all the political parties,
I found that, when not talking for publication, they differed singularly
little in their estimates and judgments.
the election which swept the Conservatives from power and resulted
in a Labor cabinet was not yet on the political horizon, most persons
with whom I talked considered a Labor government a distinct possibility
within a relatively short period. Yet neither Conservatives nor Liberals
were really alarmed at the prospect. A
few die-hard Tories and one or two Liberals did express
frank pessimism, but the more general view was that the Laborites
weren't such a bad lot after all; that they might make some foolish
mistakes at the start, but would quickly learn by experience; and
that they would be held in check by all sorts of moderating forces
like the Liberal elements within their own ranks, the permanent officials
of the government services, and the criticism of an alert and intelligent
instructive was the attitude of the Laborites themselves. In the first
place, it must be remembered that a large proportion of the leaders
of the British Labor Party are not workingmen in the ordinary sense
of the word, many of them being highly educated intellectuals drawn
from the upper and middle social classes. But whether intellectuals
or hand workers, and however sharp their criticisms of existing institutions,
very few of them had even a theoretical leaning toward violent revolutionary
well remember a talk I had with one of the so-called wild men of the
Glasgow group -- the most radical wing of the Labor Party in the last
Parliament. This radical M.P. was a picturesque person -- a live wire,
with keen gray eyes, a great shock of hair, hat cocked aggressively
to one side of his head, and a Glasgow burr that you could cut with
a knife. He was scathing in his criticism of the existing economic
order and eloquent concerning the "intolerable" condition
of the British working classes. I broached the possibility of revolutionary
action. He shook his head emphatically.
no," he answered gravely; "I'm fundamentally opposed to
revolutionary methods; they defeat their
own ends. Violence, once employed wholesale, can't
be stopped. Ye need ever more and more of it, and ruin is the final
result. Of course," he added with a twinkle in his eye, "I'm
not saying I object to a bit o' rough stuff now and then to throw
a scare into the opposition. But -- no real violence; no revolution."
even more significant was a talk I had with one of the few Labor intellectuals
who sympathize with the Bolshevik doctrine of the revolutionary dictatorship
of a militant minority imposing its proletarian will on a nation.
Despite his intellectual leanings, however, he was as convinced as
every one else that a revolution in England was impossible. Not only
were the upper and middle classes too powerful, but the working classes
were not inclined to such action. Leaders and masses alike, he said
regretfully, were too much imbued with what he rather scornfully termed
Liberal maxims like the will of the majority and the rights of minorities
to make a revolution even a remote possibility.
I believe to be an accurate statement of the case. The British workingman
is about the poorest material for a red revolution that can be imagined.
Generally speaking, he is a slow, steady fellow, content with moderate
comforts and averse to getting excited, especially over matters like
abstract theories and principles. He might raise a riot if you suddenly
clapped an extra penny on his beer, but he isn't a bit interested
in fighting for a phrase like the "dictatorship of the proletariat."
Of course there are occasional exceptions to the rule, but I doubt
if there are more than a few thousand genuine revolutionists in the
whole of Great Britain.
both Conservatives and Liberals the chief anxiety
over what a Labor government may do lies, not in
the sphere of domestic politics but concerning the non-white portions
of the empire. The importance of this matter can be appreciated when
we remember that the entire white population of the empire, including
the British Isles and all the self-governing dominions, is only about
60,000,000, whereas the non-white population of the empire is over
400,000,000. Some of the non-white portions of the empire and its
dependencies, like India and Egypt, to-day are restless and difficult
to govern. Furthermore, the relations between the non-white colonies
and the white self- governing dominions present a problem of increasing
seriousness. The demand of the Indians to migrate freely throughout
the empire -- a demand absolutely rejected by the white dominions
-- is an especially ticklish matter. It is most emphatically loaded
with dynamite and if roughly handled might cause an explosion that
would literally blow the British Empire to bits.
these thorny problems Conservatives and Liberals hold opinions which,
however they may differ in details, are basically the same. The Labor
Party, however, has in the past taken quite another attitude, and
has favored much wider concessions to Indian and other demands for
self- government than the older British parties have thought wise
or possible. Accordingly in both Conservative and Liberal circles
there exists a widespread apprehension that a Labor government may
make mistakes in imperial policy that can never be rectified. As a
prominent Conservative said to me: "My chief fear is that Labor
in power may light a fire in India that neither they nor we can afterward
put out." Whether this pessimism is justifi-
fied remains to be seen. It shows, however, the gravity
of Britain's imperial problems and the necessity for continuous statesmanship
in their handling if irreparable damage is to be averted.
pressing even than imperial questions are the problems arising from
Britain's industrial situation. We have already seen how during the
past century England made herself the industrial heart of the world,
thereby gaining great wealth and increasing her population nearly
300 per cent. But we also saw that this vast population was dependent
for its very life upon precisely that same complex and nicely adjusted
system of manufacturing, commerce, shipping, and banking which had
brought it into being.
Americans can hardly realize what such a situation means. Our country
is so large, our natural resources are so vast, and our climates are
so varied that we could get along fairly well if all the rest of the
world were to sink beneath the ocean. For Britain, however, such an
event would be the most frightful catastrophe. Left to herself, more
than half her present population would literally have to starve. Britain's
economic situation is thus fundamentally artificial. It is not a natural
but a man- made creation, which can be maintained only by tireless
foresight, energy, and skill.
for many years past it has been getting harder for Britain to keep
up the pace. There are two main reasons for this: the increasing severity
of foreign competition and the steady growth of her own population.
When Britain became an industrial nation, about a century ago, she
had the field almost to herself, and for a
long time she made something like monopoly profits.
But little by little other nations began to take a hand in the game,
so that to keep her foreign trade against competition Britain had
to work harder, produce more efficiently, and sell more cheaply. That
was the only way that she could support her population. Also, that
population was rapidly growing. In other words, it was getting harder
to feed British mouths, and there were ever more British mouths to
present economic difficulties are no recent development. They are
of long standing. As far back as the year 1872 the balance of trade
began to run against her; that is, her exports fell below her imports.
And the balance of trade has continued to run pretty steadily against
her ever since. Of course, Britain has covered the balance by "invisible
exports" like shipping services, banking profits, and returns
of capital invested abroad. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it
became increasingly difficult to support her population.
a matter of fact, not all her population was properly supported. The
widespread poverty in England's great cities and industrial centres
has long been proverbial, and England's poor consisted not merely
of her degenerate pauper elements, who were practically unemployable,
but also of many persons able and willing to work yet unable to find
work, or able to find it only part of the time. The result was a vast
mass of people underfed, living from hand to mouth, and dependent
upon public or private charity. Their numbers were disclosed during
the war, when Britain's man power was systematically examined by draft
boards to determine their physical fitness for military
service. The amount of physical unfitness due, not
to inborn degeneracy, but to poor living conditions, which those examinations
disclosed was far greater than had been previously imagined.
course, during the war living conditions among the poor were much
improved. Millions of men went off to fight, while every able-bodied
man and woman left at home was sure of a job to keep Britain's war
machine supplied. The problem of unemployment virtually disappeared.
But this was an artificial, unhealthy situation which could not last
and which was bound to be followed by an acute reaction. Britain was
mortgaging her future by huge taxes and loans which would have to
be repaid. The war once over, back came the millions of soldiers demanding
jobs, while at the same time the war boom collapsed in that great
industrial depression which hit not only England but the whole world
as well. With markets everywhere disorganized, and with some of her
best customers, like Germany and Russia, more or less out of business,
Britain's foreign trade was hit a body blow and her whole industrial
life slowed down. Once more the spectre of unemployment raised its
ugly head. To avert wholesale semistarvation, the British Government
supplemented existing measures of poor relief by a great system of
unemployment insurance. The need for such action is shown by the numbers
of persons applying for assistance. Since the year 1920, when the
system went into effect, averages of from 1,000,000 to 1,800,000 persons
have been assisted as totally unemployed, while the number of persons
assisted as being only partially employed has averaged about 500,000.
These people, be it remembered, are
genuine employables, able to work if work can be
found. In addition to them is the host of unemployables -- the physically
unfit, mentally defective and degenerate elements who are supported
by public or private charity.
is Britain's unemployment problem, and it is difficult to see how
any political action can really solve it. Wise measures can better
it somewhat, while unwise measures can make it much worse. But the
cure -- if cure there be -- lies outside Britain, in the general world
situation. The hard fact is that, as things now are, Britain's industry
and trade cannot support her population, which continues to grow and
thus makes the problem more and more difficult.
population is increasing between 300,000 and 400,000 a year. How are
these new mouths to be fed? Many Englishmen advocate wholesale emigration
to the dominions. Great efforts have been made and much money spent
to this end. And yet the annual quota of British emigrants to all
parts of the world averages less than 200,000. Thus not even the annual
increase of population is taken care of. But under present world conditions
Britain probably has at least 5,000,000 more people than can be supported
in reasonable comfort. Here, truly, is a problem that will test British
statesmanship to the full.
is assuredly one of the great motives in British foreign policy. Determined
as she is to build up her foreign trade, Britain feels it absolutely
necessary to restore stability and prosperity to the Continent of
Europe. This explains British policy toward Germany and Russia.
likewise explains in great measure her policy toward France, which
most Englishmen regard as blocking the road to Europe's economic recovery.
is useless for Frenchmen to talk to Englishmen about the possible
future political dangers that British policy may evolve. The present
economic motive is so pressing that most Englishmen are willing to
take the political risks that may be involved. A prominent French
politician hit this off very well when he told me about a conversation
he had had with a British cabinet minister not long after the war.
The Frenchman asked the minister if he did not think England was playing
a dangerous game in trying to build up Germany and Russia -- the two
powers which she had most feared in the past -- and pointed out several
unpleasant political possibilities.
replied the Englishman, "all you say may be true, and if it turns
out that way we may have to fight 'em ten years hence. But now we
must trade and make money."
is very easy to label this sort of thing as short-sighted and to call
the English a nation of shopkeepers and similar unpleasant things.
That, in fact, was the way my French acquaintance felt, and he told
the anecdote I have just narrated to prove his point. To me, however,
it proved something quite different -- namely, British coolness and
common sense. Englishmen rarely waste time spinning elaborate logical
theories of what may happen in the future. Instead, they look at what
is happening in the present, see what is amiss, get after it, and
keep their eye on the ball. That is why, in the long run, they usually
come out on top.
is just these qualities of practical common sense and dislike of theorizing
that cause the English to be so persistently misjudged by their more
logical and argumentative Continental neighbors. Except when really
stirred, the Englishman is apt to draw into his shell and to become
aloof and inarticulate. Not realizing how Englishmen are thinking
and working beneath the casual exterior of British life, Continentals
frequently underrate them and may even come to think England decadent.
That is what happened with the Germans before the war, and when I
was recently in Europe I found a distinct tendency of the same sort
among Frenchmen and Italians. I discussed this point at length with
one of the most thoughtful of England's publicists, having specially
in mind the growing misunderstanding between French and British public
opinion. My friend considered that the way many Frenchmen were belittling
England was perhaps the most serious aspect of the whole situation.
British people," said he, "are grappling with their problems
and are bearing their burdens with unflinching grit and determination.
This indomitable spirit is the basic trait of the English people.
It also shows what great reserves of energy and poise are latent within
them, though this is never visible except in crises, because the English
are ordinarily so inarticulate and so self-repressed. That is why
Continentals are continually coming to believe England decadent. Germany
made that mistake a short time ago. Well, perhaps that is not surprising,
because England had not been put to the test for one hundred years.
But here is the extraordinary fact: people on the Continent are beginning
to say just
the same things to-day, despite the lesson of the
late war. And therein lies a real danger, because it may lead such
people -- notably in France -- to despise England and challenge her
in what she regards as life-and-death matters. And then Britain will
give the Continent another surprise."
and determination are, indeed, the underlying traits of the British
people. Those traits do not reveal themselves fully to the passing
traveller, for the Englishman is at once reserved and casual before
strangers. But after you have been in England a while and have got
a bit below the surface, you will be impressed by the calm resolution
with which the English are facing their problems and bearing their
burdens. The problems are many; the burdens are heavy. England was
hard hit by the war. Her people are frightfully taxed and her industrial
life is still somewhat out of gear. The working classes are haunted
by the spectre of unemployment, while the upper and middle classes
have lost much of their old prosperity. Britain is, in fact, going
through a period of profound readjustment -- never a pleasant experience
-- and Englishmen admit frankly that the process will be hard and
long. Yet practically all Englishmen are firmly convinced that Britain
will win through.
of the points on which British public opinion is unusually solid is
the necessity of good relations with America. That does not mean that
the English all cordially like us. Of course many Englishmen do, but
others cordially dislike us, while still others know almost nothing
about us, their chief acquaintance with things American being derived
from the omnipresent American moving
picture, which usually presents either a distortion
or a caricature of American life.
yet, in the larger sense, all this matters very little. To judge Anglo-American
relations on a basis of individual likes and dislikes -- as is too
often done -- is a shortsighted and rather silly attitude that quite
overlooks the basic realities of the case. The really important thing
is that, though some Englishmen may like and others may dislike Americans,
practically all Englishmen are convinced that Britain must be on good
terms with America.
is one of the corner-stones of British foreign policy. Anglo-American
relations are, indeed, inspired by a happy blend of sentiment and
self-interest, which is the best guaranty for their stability. As
peoples, we may sometimes rub each other the wrong way; but we both
feel instinctively that we are kindred in blood and basic ideals.
As nations, we may develop differences in policy; yet we both know
that such differences are vastly outweighed by the interests we have
in common. We both realize profoundly that real enmity between us
would be a hideous disaster which might well spell our common undoing.
This feeling is particularly keen in the dominions of the British
Empire -- Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the rest. The dominions
know that conflict in the English-speaking world would be for them
the worst of disasters. They are thus added links in the chain of
friendship between Britain and America.
signs, therefore, point to lasting concord and growing co-operation
between the English-speaking peoples. Disagreements may arise, but
they will be settled by the good sense and temperate reasonableness
terize both stocks. Not for nothing are we both mainly
Nordic in blood! The intelligence and self-control inborn in the Nordic
race can be trusted to give us sober second thoughts and to guard
us against being swept off our feet by gusts of passion which might
blind us to our larger interests. America and Britain will never again
be foes; and so far as anything can be predicted, they seem destined
to become steadily better friends.